This course allows students to deal with the issue of organisational design in industrial engineering, using the most recent economic analysis tools. The aim is first to identify and understand the rules of exchange (markets and contracts), secondly to evaluate their efficiency and performance and thirdly to devise more efficient alternative or new rules.
This course aims at giving students the knowledge and skills to be able to respond to the following two main design issues:
• How to improve the performance of an intermediary market by changing:
-the actors involved in these markets (intermediaries, central purchasing)
-the nature of the products sold (standardisation, supply contracts)
-the methods of sale (OTC competitive bidding, continuous Internet markets)
Examples are taken from various sectors posing specific problems of coordination and competition: wholesale electric power markets (network industry and non-shelf product), timber markets, raw beef markets (industry dismantling), dairy product markets (ultra-fresh), internationalised commodity markets (copper, sugar), machine-tools markets or aerospace markets (markets for specific products and rarely renewed).
• How to improve the performance of a business delegation contract.
Again the course combines both research on design principles and contract formalisation. Students will explore in depth cases in areas of supply contracts throughout the supply chain, human resource management and corporate governance.
Part 1. Contractual relations between firms
1.1. Horizontal and vertical mergers
1.2. Price and non-price vertical restraints
Part 2. Market solutions: network issues and auctions
2.1. Network issues
2.2. Auctions and auction markets
2.3. Information and markets
Session 1. Introduction and horizontal mergers
Session 2. Vertical mergers
Session 3. Vertical restraints
Session 4. Network issues
Session 5. Auction and auction markets
Session 6. Information and markets
Basics in microeconomics
Examen terminal 60% TD 20% TP 20%
Session 2 écrit ou oral
The course exists in the following branches:
Course ID : 4GML0325
You can find this course among all other courses.
Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, 2013.
Roberts John, The Modern Firm, Oxford UP, 2004.
Milgrom P., Roberts J., Economics, Organization, and Management, Prentice Hall, 1992. Traduction, Economie, Organisation et Management, PUG-De Boeck, 1997.
Prendergast C. ‘The Provision of Incentives in Firms’, Journal of Economic Literature, 1999.
Gibbons R., ‘Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2005
Gibbons R., ‘Incentives Between Firms (and Within) Management Science, 2005
Gibbons R., ‘Transaction Costs Economics: Past, Present, and Future’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2010
Arrow, Kenneth. 1974. The Limits of Organization.New York: W. W. Norton.
Chandler, Alfred. 1962. Strategy and Structure.Cambridge,MA:MIT Press.
Chandler, Alfred. 1977. The Visible Hand.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press.
Date of update June 5, 2015